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Further Evidence
WILCO W. VAN DIJK
SJOERD GOSLINGA
JAAP W. OUWERKERK
VU University Amsterdam
ABSTRACT. The authors tested the hypothesis that the more individuals are responsible 
for their own misfortune, the more schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure derived from another’s 
misfortune) and less sympathy the misfortune evokes in others. The results support the 
hypothesis, thereby providing further evidence for the role responsibility plays in emo-
tional reactions to the misfortunes of others.
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WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO OTHER PEOPLE reactions can take 
several forms. In his seminal book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, 
Heider (1958) distinguished two possible emotional reactions of a person (P) to 
the misfortune of others (O). First, P can experience sympathy when a negative 
Replications and Refinements
Under this heading are brief reports of studies providing data that sub-
stantiate, challenge, or refine what we think we know. These notes con-
sist of a summary of the study’s procedure and as many details about the 
results as space allows. Additional details concerning the results can be 
obtained by communicating directly with the author. Submissions to this 
section must provide a meaningful conceptual replication that extends 
the construct validity of the work.
experience for O is also negative for P. Second, P can experience schadenfreude 
(i.e., pleasure derived from another’s misfortune) when a negative experience for 
O is positive for P. Whereas the former emotional reaction “presupposes a sympa-
thetic ‘identification,’ the latter ‘shows a discordance or antagonism between [P] 
and [O]’” (Heider, 1958, p. 277–278). For this reason, Heider saw schadenfreude 
as harmful to social relations (cf. Leach, Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). 
Although theoretical accounts of schadenfreude date back to the work of 
philosophers such as Nietzsche, Plato, and Spinoza (Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Plato 
427–348 BCE/1925; Spinoza, 1677/2002), empirical research on this emotion did 
not occur until the late 1990s. These empirical studies showed that schadenfreude 
is more likely to occur when misfortunes happen to high achievers, tall poppies 
(Feather, 1993, 1994), or people who are envied (Smith et al., 1996; Van Dijk, 
Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006), disliked (Hareli & Weiner, 
2002; Van Dijk et al., 2006), or resented (Feather & Sherman, 2002). 
In addition to these determinants of schadenfreude, several scholars have 
proposed that the deservingness of a misfortune evokes schadenfreude. Presum-
ably, the more a misfortune is seen to be deserved, the more schadenfreude is 
evoked (e.g., Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Feather, 1994, 1999; Heider, 1958; Ortony, Clore, 
& Collins, 1988; Portmann, 2000). This finding corroborates research showing 
that others’ deserved outcomes elicit positive emotions in observers, whereas 
others’ undeserved outcomes elicit negative emotions (Feather, 2006). More-
over, research has indicated that the more individuals are responsible for their 
own outcome, the more they are seen as deserving the outcome (Feather, 1999). 
Together, this would imply that the more individuals are responsible for their own 
misfortune, the more positive emotions (i.e., schadenfreude) and less negative 
emotions (i.e., sympathy) this misfortune evokes in others. 
Previous research yielded conflicting results concerning the impact of 
responsibility on emotional reactions of schadenfreude and sympathy. Specifi-
cally, Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, and Nieweg (2005) showed that targets 
who were seen to be responsible for their own misfortune evoked more schaden-
freude and less sympathy than targets who were not held responsible for their 
misfortune. However, this finding was contradicted by the results of other studies. 
For example, although Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, and Smith (1997) found support 
for the impact of responsibility on sympathy, their results yielded no effect of 
responsibility on the experience of schadenfreude. Similarly, Feather and Sher-
man (2002) found a significant effect for personal control (a proxy measure for 
responsibility) on sympathy, but again no effect on schadenfreude was obtained. 
In sum, previous research results in opposing results concerning the relation 
among responsibility, schadenfreude, and sympathy.
In the present study, we provided a further examination of the role of respon-
sibility in emotional reactions to the misfortunes of others. We hypothesized 
that the misfortune of a responsible target would evoke more schadenfreude 
and less sympathy than the misfortune of a nonresponsible target. Support for 
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our hypothesis provided further empirical evidence concerning the impact of 
responsibility for a misfortune on schadenfreude and sympathy.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 130 students (78 women, 52 men; M age = 21.18 years, 
SD age = 3.01 years) from the VU University Amsterdam, who were all paid for 
their participation. We randomly assigned them to one of the two experimental 
conditions (responsibility for the misfortune, responsible vs. not responsible). 
Procedure and Dependent Variables
On arrival at the laboratory, we led participants to separate cubicles and gave 
them a booklet containing an experimental scenario in which a person suffered a 
career-related misfortune, and measures concerning the dependent variables. We 
manipulated details of the scenario to make the target appear either responsible 
(n = 61) or not responsible (n = 69) for his or her misfortune. After they read the 
scenario, we asked participants to respond to statements pertaining to their reac-
tions to the misfortune of the target on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). One statement assessed responsibility 
for the misfortune. Five statements assessed schadenfreude (Cronbach’s α = .80): 
“I enjoy what happened to [the target]”1; “I’m satisfied with what happened to 
[the target]”; “I couldn’t resist a little smile”; “I actually had to laugh a bit”; and 
“I feel schadenfreude2.” Three statements assessed sympathy (α = .83): “I com-
miserate with [the target] about what happened”; “I feel sorry for what happened 
to [the target]”; and “I sympathize with [the target].” 
Results
Manipulation Check
An independent samples t test performed on measures of the target’s 
responsibility for the misfortune yielded a significant effect of our responsibil-
ity manipulation, t(128) = 9.31, p < .001. Participants perceived a target in the 
responsible condition to be more responsible for the misfortune (M = 5.92, SD = 
1.28) than a target in the not responsible condition (M = 3.16, SD = 1.98). This 
result indicates that our manipulation of responsibility was successful.
Analyses of Variance
A multivariate analysis of variance performed on the measures of 
schadenfreude and sympathy yielded a significant multivariate effect of 
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responsibility for the misfortune, F(2, 127) = 5.90, p = .004, Pη2 = .09 
(for relevant means, standard deviations, and correlations, see Table 1). As 
expected, follow-up univariate analyses of variance indicated that partici-
pants experienced more schadenfreude toward the misfortune of a respon-
sible target (M = 3.16, SD = 0.99) than the misfortune of a nonresponsible 
target (M = 2.58, SD = 1.12), F(1, 128) = 9.79, p = .002, Pη2 = .07. Fur-
thermore, as expected, results indicated that participants experienced less 
sympathy toward the misfortune of a responsible target (M = 4.76, SD = 
1.34) than the misfortune of a nonresponsible target (M = 5.31, SD = 1.21), 
F(1, 128) = 6.14, p = .015, Pη2 = .05. 
Discussion 
The present study provided a further examination of the impact of respon-
sibility on schadenfreude and sympathy toward another person’s misfortune. 
Results clearly showed that another person’s responsibility for a misfortune 
intensifies schadenfreude while attenuating sympathy for the unfortunate 
other. Thus, although earlier research on responsibility, schadenfreude, and 
sympathy yielded opposing findings, the present findings provide important 
further evidence for the impact of responsibility on emotional reactions to the 
misfortunes of others.
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TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Schadenfreude, Sympathy, 
and Responsibility and Correlations Between These Variables in Relation to 
Responsibility for Misfortune Manipulations
Variable M SD Sympathy Responsibility
Schadenfreude
 Responsible 3.16 0.99 –.24* .14
 Not responsible 2.58 1.12 –.47*** .34***
 Overall 2.85 1.10 –.40*** .37***
Sympathy
 Responsible 4.76 1.34 — –.27**
 Not responsible 5.31 1.21 — –.22*
 Overall 5.05 1.29 — –.31***
Responsibility
 Responsible 5.92 1.28 — —
 Not responsible 3.16 1.98 — —
 Overall 4.45 2.17 — —
Note. Scores are on a 7-point scale. Higher numbers indicate more schadenfreude, more sym-
pathy, or more responsibility. nresp = 61; nnot resp = 69; Noverall = 130. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Possible Limitations and Future Directions
A possible limitation of our present (scenario-based) methodology concerns 
potential experimental demands and social desirability. These methodological 
considerations may be especially relevant in the context of studying less socially 
desirable emotions, such as schadenfreude. Future research on schadenfreude 
should combine a scenario-based approach with other experimental paradigms. 
For example, it should combine a methodology in which actual (comparison) 
information is provided, key measures have been filtered among other items, and 
a cover story is included that masks the true purpose of the study. 
In conclusion, one potential fruitful avenue for future research is the relations 
among responsibility, schadenfreude, and belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). 
Lerner argued that individuals need to believe in a just world in which everybody 
gets what they deserve because this belief enables them to cope with their envi-
ronment as if it were stable and orderly. Previous researchers have documented 
that the strength of belief in a just world varies between individuals (Mudrack, 
2005; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). It may be worthwhile to investigate whether 
individuals high in their belief in a just world would perceive targets as more 
responsible for their own misfortunes and subsequently also experience more 
schadenfreude and less sympathy toward the targets. Such a research enterprise 
may provide additional support for the links among responsibility, schadenfreude, 
and sympathy.
NOTES
1. About half of the participants were presented with a female target named Marleen, 
whereas the remaining participants were presented with a male target named Mark. Initial 
analyses showed no main or interaction effects of the target’s gender (Fs < 1). Thus, this 
variable was not included in the reported analyses. 
2. We used the term leedvermaak, which is the Dutch word for schadenfreude. The 
first use of this word in the Dutch language has been dated to the year 1811.
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